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This  paper  Integrates  Yaari’s  dual  theory  of  choice  under  uncertamty  into  a  multiperiod  context 
and  examines  its  imphcations  for  the  equity  premium  puzzle.  An  Important  property  of  these 
preferences  IS  that  of  ‘tirst-order  risk  aversion’  which  implies.  in  our  model.  that  the  risk 
premium  for  a  small  gamble  is  proportronal  to  the  standard  deviation  rather  than  the  variance. 
Since  the  standard  devration  of  the  growth  rate  m  aggregate  consumptron  is  considerably  larger 
than  Its  varrance,  the  model  can  generate  both  a  small  rusk-free  rate  and  a  moderate  equity 
premmm. 
1.  Introduction 
It  is  common  practice  in  macroeconomics  and  finance  to  employ  a  repre- 
sentative  agent  model  in  order  to  organize  aggregate  data  on  consumption 
and  asset  returns.  Because  of  the  smoothness  of  aggregate  consumption  data 
for  the  U.S.,  the  way  in  which  the  agent’s  risk  preferences  evaluate  small 
gambles  about  certainty  is critical  for  providing  a  good  fit  to  the  data.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  plausibility  of  utility  specifications  is  often  evaluated  infor- 
mally  on  the  basis  of  their  evaluation  of  moderate  or  large  gambles  derived 
from  thought  experiments  or  ‘real  world’  risks.  Thus  it  is  desirable  to  have  a 
functional  form  for  risk  preferences  which  can  model  plausible  risk  attitudes 
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over  a broad  range  of gamble  sizes. The  common  constant-relative-risk-averse, 
expected  utility  function  fails  in  this  respect,  as  pointed  out  by  Kandel  and 
Stambaugh  (19891,  for  example.  In  this  paper  we  describe  an  alternative 
nonexpected  utility  functional  form  for  risk  preferences  that  is better  able  to 
satisfy  the  above  desideratum,  while  retaining  the  constancy  of  the  degree  of 
relative  risk  aversion  and  the  tractability  which  that  constancy  affords.  Then 
we examine  the  extent  to which  the  new  functional  form  helps  to  resolve  the 
equity  premium  puzzle  posed  by Mehra  and  Prescott  (19851. 
Mehra  and  Prescott  argue  that  the  representative  agent,  expected  additive 
utility  model,  sensibly  restricted,  cannot  account  for  both  the  0.8  percent 
average  real  return  on  debt  and  the  nearly  7.0 percent  average  real  return  on 
equity  that  the  U.S.  data  show  for  the  1889-1978  period.  The  qualification 
‘sensibly  restricted’  is essential  for  the  existence  of  a puzzle.  For  example,  as 
the  authors  describe  (p.  154), with  a sufficiently  large  degree  of  relative  risk 
aversion  ‘virtually  any  pair  of  average  equity  and  risk-free  returns  can  be 
obtained  by making  small  changes  in the  process  on  consumption’.  In  related 
modelling  exercises,  a  number  of  authors  have  shown  that  with  a  degree  of 
relative  risk  aversion  in  the  20-30  range,  the  representative  agent  model 
performs  fairly  well  [see,  for  example,  Grossman,  Melino,  and  Shiller  (19871, 
Kandel  and  Stambaugh  (19891, and  Cecchetti  and  Mark  (199011.  On  the  other 
hand,  as  shown  by  Kocherlakota  (19881,  allowing  negative  time  preference 
aIso  helps  the  model  to  match  the  above  historical  averages.  To  some  extent 
what  is ‘sensible’  or  ‘plausible’  is subject  to  personal  judgement,  though  as 
advocated  by Mehra  and  Prescott,  evidence  from  other  areas  can  and  should 
be  brought  to  bear  upon  the  choice  of  parameter  values.  In  this  paper  we 
maintain  the  common  assumption  of  positive  discounting  of  the  future,  an 
assumption  which  needs  no  defense  here.  Our  specification  of  risk  prefer- 
ences,  which  is where  we  deviate  from  the  standard  model,  is appealing  on 
two  grounds.  First,  as  previously  described,  for  the  same  parameter  values, 
our  specification  implies  a  degree  of  risk  aversion  for  a  broad  range  of 
gambles  that  is plausible  on  introspective  grounds.  Second,  our  model  of  risk 
preferences  can  explain  evidence,  such  as Allais-type  behavior,  which  contra- 
dicts  expected  utility  theory,  thereby  providing  a  uniting  framework  for 
organizing  observations  of  individual  behavior  in  the  laboratory  and  data  on 
aggregate  market  behavior. 
Following  Epstein  and  Zin  (19891  and  Weil  (19901,  we  assume  that  in- 
tertemporal  utility  is  recursive  thus  permitting  the  notions  of  risk  aversion 
and  intertemporal  substitutability  to  be  partially  disentangled  [see  also 
Epstein  (1988)].  Roughly  speaking,  recursive  utility  specifications  have  two 
components,  corresponding  to  certainty  preferences  (substitution)  and  risk 
preferences,  respectively.  An  integral  part  of  our  model  is  the  assumption 
that  risk  preferences  exhibit  ‘first-order’  risk  aversion  in  the  sense  recently 
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amongst  monetary  gambles,  the  risk  premium  for  small  risks  about  certainty 
is  proportional  to  the  variance  of  the  gamble,  at  least  if  the  von 
Neumann-Morgenstern  index  is  twice  differentiable.  That  is  because,  as 
Pratt  (1964.  p.  1261 notes,  to  the  first-order,  utility  is  linear  and  thus  the  risk 
premium  is  determined  by  second-order  terms.  Correspondingly,  we  think  of 
this  case  as  one  of  ‘second-order’  risk  aversion.  On  the  other  hand,  if the  risk 
premium  is  proportional  to  the  standard  deviation  of  the  gamble,  then  we 
speak  of  ‘first-order’  risk  aversion.  Given  the  smoothness  of  consumption 
data,  the  standard  deviation  of  the  consumption  growth  rate  is  considerably 
larger  than  its  variance.  Therefore,  the  role  played  by  first-order  risk  aversion 
in  generating  a  sizeable  equity  premium  is  intuitive.  A  nonexpected  utility 
theory  of  risk  preference  which  exhibits  first-order  risk  aversion  and  which 
we  adopt  here  is  rank-dependent  expected  utility,  where  the  rank  ordering  of 
outcomes  plays  a  critical  role.  A  special  case  that  is  useful  below  is  Yaari’s 
(19871  dual  theory  of  choice.  The  rank-dependent  theory  has  respectable 
theoretical  credentials  [for  axiomatizations  see  Quiggin  (19821,  Yaari  (19871, 
and  Segal  (198911  and  some  empirical  support  (see  section  41. 
We  conclude  this  introduction  by  adding  to  the  papers  already  cited  a 
number  of  other  relevant  studies  of  the  equity  premium  puzzle  and  related 
asset  pricing  issues.  Reitz  (1988)  posits  the  possibility  of  disasters  with  small 
but  positive  probabilities.  [See  Mehra  and  Prescott  (1988)  for  a  discussion.] 
Constantinides  (1990)  ‘resolves’  the  puzzle  by  means  of  a  habit-formation 
specification  but  only  by  assuming  negative  time  preference.  Weil  (1989) 
adopts  a recursive  intertemporal  utility  specification  in  which  risk  preferences 
exhibit  second-order  risk  aversion.  He  argues  that  the  separation  of  substitu- 
tion  from  risk  aversion  does  not  improve  upon  the  performance  of  the 
Mehra-Prescott  model  [see  also  Kocherlakota  (199011.  Weil  shows  that  the 
risk  premium  increases  as  the  elasticity  of  substitution  falls  (independently  of 
risk  aversion),  but  with  the  adverse  consequence  of  inflating  the  risk-free 
rate,  e.g.,  1.31%  premium  with  a  21.68%  risk-free  rate.  On  the  other  hand, 
with  risk  preferences  that  exhibit  first-order  risk  aversion,  we  show  that  a 
modest  risk  premium,  e.g.,  1.6%,  is  compatible  with  a  risk-free  rate  on  the 
order  of  2.6%.  Finally,  Epstein  and  Zin  (1990)  estimate  the  Euler  equations 
implied  by  the  same  parametric  specification  employed  by  Weil.  Using  U.S. 
aggregate  monthly  data  on  consumption  and  asset  returns,  they  find  some 
support  for  the  general  utility  specifications  while  the  data  generally  reject 
the  standard  intertemporally  additive  expected  utility  function.  However,  the 
general  equilibrium  interrelations  between  consumption  and  asset  returns, 
which  are  implied  by  the  theory  and  which  are  central  to  the  present  study, 
are  not  tested  there. 
The  paper  proceeds  as  follows:  Section  2 describes  the  asset-pricing  model 
with  recursive  utility  and  general  risk  preferences.  Next  rank-dependent 
preferences  and  first-order  risk  aversion  are  defined  and  discussed.  In  section 390  L. G.  Epsfem  and  S.E.  Zin.  ‘Fwsi-order’  nsk  arersion 
4  we  discuss  the  plausibility  of  our  utility  specification  and  its  calibration. 
Finally,  a  number  of  numerical  simulations  are  described  in  section  5. 
Concluding  remarks  are  offered  in  section  6. 
2.  Asset  pricing  with  recursive  utility’ 
A  representative  agent  consumes  a  single  perishable  consumption  good  in 
each  period.  In  period  t,  current  consumption  c,  is  known  with  certainty  but 
future  consumption  levels  are  generally  uncertain.  The  intertemporal  utility 
functional  is  recursive  in  the  sense  that  the  utility  U,,  derived  from  consump- 
tion  in  period  t  and  beyond,  satisfies  the  recursive  relation 
(/, =  W(c,,p,),  t 2  0,  (1) 
where  ~~ =  .<ot+  ,)  is  the  certainty  equivalent  of  random  future  utility  tit+, 
and  W  is  called  an  aggregator.  The  latter  aggregates  current  consumption  c, 
with  a certainty  equivalent  index  of  future  consumption  in  order  to  determine 
current  utility  I?~,. 
We  restrict  W  to  have  the  CES  form 
W(c,  z)  =  (CP + pz”p.  O#p<l,  o<p<1.  (2) 
Then  the  utility  of  deterministic  consumption  paths  is  given  by  the  CES 
intertemporal  utility  function 
having  elasticity  of  substitution  (1  -  PI-‘. 
The  functional  k  assigns  a  certainty  equivalent  to  any  real-valued  random 
variable  and  is  the  risk  preference  function  referred  to  in  the  introduction. 
For  example,  in  EZ  (1990)  and  in  Weil  (1989,  1990)  the  following  specifica- 
tion  is  considered: 
P(G+J  = 
(E,Lj,‘;,)‘-,  O#a<l, 
ew(E,  log(q+,)),  a =O, 
(3) 
where  E,  is  the  expectation  conditional  on  period-f  information.  Mehra  and 
Prescott  (1985)  further  impose  LY  = p,  which  leads  to  the  standard  intertem- 
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poral  expected  utility  function 
if  p  #  0.  Alternative  specifications  will  be  adopted  below.  In  all  cases,  it  is 
assumed  that  p  reflects  constant  relatil’e risk arlersion, i.e., 
Pwn  =&-4-Q,  VA >o.  (4) 
The  function  p  embodies  the  agent’s  risk  aversion  in  the  following  sense:  the 
intertemporal  preference  ordering  represented  by  U  becomes  more  risk- 
averse  if  p  is  held  fixed  and  p  becomes  more  risk-averse  as  a  functional  of 
real-valued  random  variables  or  associated  distribution  functions. 
The  agent’s  economic  environment  is  identical  to  that  in  Mehra  and 
Prescott  (1985)  and  similar  to  that  in  Lucas  (1978).  In  particular,  the 
endowment  process  {Y,}:  is  such  that  growth  rates  x,,  , =yf+,/y,  follow  a 
first-order  Markov  process.  The  ex-dividend  price  of  the  single  equity  asset 
may  be  described  by  the  time-invariant  and  positive  function  p(x,,  y,).  In 
light  of  the  homogeneity  of  preferences  it  follows  that  price  is  linearly 
homogeneous  in  current  output,  i.e., 
p(x,p)=p(x,l)Y~p(x)Y.  (5) 
Denote  by  M,,  ,  the  return  to  equity,  and  therefore  to  the  market,  over  the 
interval  from  t  to  t +  1, i.e., 
M  E  P(X 
ftl 
,+I-?‘r+,) +yr+,  ‘x,+,  (P(x,+,) + 1). 
PC  x,  3  Yt )  P(x,) 
(6) 
In  equilibrium,  the  agent  maximizes  utility,  markets  clear,  and  price 
expectations  are  fulfilled.  Thus  [from  EZ  (1989,  eq.  (5.9))], 
where  we  have  made  explicit  the  conditioning  information  1, =  (x,,  y,).  If  we 
substitute  (6)  and  apply  (4),  we  obtain  immediately  the  following  recursive 
relation  which  must  be  satisfied  by  any  equilibrium  price  function: 
P(x,)  =PYP(~t+,wl+,~  + l)‘/‘IZt).  t 20.  (7) 
Note  that  when  p  is  defined  by  (3)  with  (Y  = p,  (7)  reduces  to  the  familiar 
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recursive  relation  in  Mehra  and  Prescott  (1985).  In  general,  (6)  and  (71 
determine  the  return  to  equity  in  this  economy. 
To  determine  the  risk-free  return  rf  (whose  time  dependence  is suppressed 
in  this  notation)  implied  by  our  model,  add  a  risk-free  asset  to  the  choice  set 
of  the  individual.  From  EZ  (1989,  eq.  (5.10)1,  the  individual’s  portfolio  choice 
is  determined  by  solving 
(8) 
Of  course,  a  denotes  the  proportion  of  savings  invested  in  equity.  The 
risk-free  return  rf  is  fixed  by  the  requirements  that  at  an  optimum  of  (8) 
a * =  1 and  the  constraint  a  I  1 should  not  be  binding. 
A  useful  special  case  of  the  model  is  one  where  growth  rates  are  i.i.d.  In 
that  case,  P  is  constant  and,  therefore  by  (6),  M,,  ,/xt+,  = K  is  also 
constant.  Given  the  homogeneity  of  I_L,  this  constant  can  be  factored  out  of 
(8)  and  we  conclude  that  (8)  can  be  replaced  by  the  following  myopic 
portfolio  choice  problem  with  risk  preferences  corresponding  to  I_L: 
(9) 
Conditioning  information  and  the  time  subscript  have  been  deleted  since  h;I, 
is  i.i.d.  In  addition.  (6)  and  (71 imply  that 
In  particular,  the  constant  of  proportionality  K  between  the  market  return 
h;I and  the  consumption  growth  rate  2  is 
K=p-‘/P(i).  (11) 
The  conditions  for  existence  of  an  equilibrium  are  readily  derived  in  the 
i.i.d.  case.  A  positive  price,  P,  solving  (7)  exists  if  and  only  if 
p/_Lq i)  <  1.  (12) 
In  the  non-i.i.d.  experiments  of  section  5  we  prove  existence  of  a  positive 
solution  to  (7)  by  direct  computation.’ 
‘A  sufficient  condition  for  the  existence  of  such  a  PC.)  is  that  Ppp(,?,+,  1  I,) < 1 for  all  t 2  0. 
If  /*  1s given  by  (3)  and  a  =p  and  If  a  finite-state  Markov  chain  1s assumed  for  X,,  then  this 
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3.  Risk  preferences 
In  this  section  we  consider  functional  forms  for  the  risk  preference  or 
certainty-equivalent  function  p  and  then  relate  the  specifications  to  the 
notion  of  first-order  risk  aversion.  The  functional  forms  are  all  consistent 
with  monotonicity  (in  the  sense  of  first-degree  stochastic  dominance),  risk 
aversion  (in  the  sense  of  aversion  to  mean-preserving  spreads),  and  constant 
relative  risk  aversion  [in  the  sense  of  (411. They  also  satisfy  the  normalization 
p(x)  =x,  x  >  0,  (I31 
where  x’ in  p(x)  refers  to  the  random  variable  that  equals  x  with  certainty. 
It  suffices  for  our  purposes  to  consider  only  random  variables  X  having 
finitely  many  positive  distinct  outcomes,  x,,  . . . , x,,,  with  associated  probabili- 
ties  pr..  . . , p,,. The  following  specification  corresponds  to  Yaari’s  (19871  dual 
theory  of  choice: 
(14) 
if  xl  <x2<  ...  <x,,.  The  function  g:  [0, 11  +  [O, 11 is  onto,  strictly  increas- 
ing,  and  concave.  If  g  is linear,  then  ~~fX.1  is simply  the  expected  value  of  X. 
But  if  g  is  strictly  concave,  then  p*u  exhibits  strict  risk  aversion  [Yaari 
( 198611. 
The  nature  of  py  is  further  clarified  by  looking  at  binary  gambles.  Then 
P*y(-Cl  =g(p,)x,  +(I  -dP,)ht  x,  <x,.  (15) 
Under  the  above  assumptions  for  g,  g(p,  1 >p,  if  the  degenerate  case  of 
linear  g  is  excluded.  Thus  the  inferior  outcome  X,  is  given  more  weight  in 
(15)  than  in  the  computation  of  Ex.  Consequently,  pcLy(i_) <  E.?,  which  is  a 
form  of  risk  aversion.  If  p,  is  fixed,  py  defines  indifference  curves  in 
outcome  space.  A  typical  indifference  curve  is  given  by  the  piecewise  linear 
curve  in  fig.  1. 
A  generalization  of  pLy  in  which  the  piecewise  linearity  is  eliminated  is 
provided  by  rank-dependent  expected  utility  theory,  according  to  which 
(1’5) 
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positive  reaI  line.”  To  ensure  the  homogeneity  (4), we  also  assume  that 
l 
,I”“--  I 
-,  o+cuc1, 
L’(X) =  Ly  ( 17) 
tlog(x),  ff  =o. 
If  a  =  1, prd  specializes  to  kY.  On  the  other  hand,  if  g(p)  =p,  the  expected 
utility  certainty-equivalent  (3)  is obtained. 
A  typica  indifference  curve  of  pL,d is shown  in fig.  1. Piecewise  linearity  is 
eliminated  (if  (Y  f  11, but  there  is still,  significantly  for  our  purposes,  a kink  at 
the  certainty  line.  The  presence  of  the  kink  corresponds  to  the  fact  that 
neither  one-sided  marginal  rate  of substitution  at certainty  equals  the  ratio  of 
‘Unless  otherwise  specified  the  rank  ordering  x,  <x2  <  . I  <;x,, IS  assumed.  For  the  ax- 
iomatic  underpinnings  of  pLrd. see  Quiggin  (1986)  and  Segal  (1989).  For  properties.  such  as  risk 
aversion,  see  Chew,  Karni,  and  Safra  (1987). L.C.  Epstem  and  S E.  Zm,  ‘First-order’  nsk  ac’ersron  395 
probabilities.  This  is  in  contrast  to  an  expected  utility  model  with  a  differen- 
tiable  von  Neumann-Morgenstern  utility  index,  where  indifference  curves 
and  the  lines  of  constant  expected  value  are  mutually  tangent  at  certainty.  As 
a  consequence,  the  first-order  term  in  the  Taylor-series  expansion  of  the  risk 
premium  vanishes  and  for  small  risks  the  risk  premium  is  proportional  to  the 
variance  of  the  gamble  [Pratt  (1964)].  In  such  a  case  we  say  that  preferences 
exhibit  second-order  risk  aversion. 
In  contrast,  in  a  model  such  as  (16)~(17),  the  risk  premium  for  a  binary 
gamble  is  proportional  to  the  standard  deviation,  rather  than  the  variance  of 
the  gamble.  To  see  this,  fix  p,  and  let  the  outcomes  X,  <x2  of  the  binary 
gamble  i  vary  near  certainty.  Then 
p,Ji)  =Ex-ka+o(a),  ( 18) 
where  u  denotes  the  standard  deviation  of  .G and 
k  =  (g(  P,>  -P,VPf”U  -P,Y.  (19) 
If  the  risk  premium  r  satisfies 
/-4-f:) =/_L(EX  -r), 
it  follows  that 
7r=ka+o(a).  (20) 
When  k >  0, which  is true  in  any  rank-dependent  model  except  the  ‘degener- 
ate’  expected  utility  special  case,  we  refer  to  first-order  risk  alvrsion.  [See 
Segal  and  Spivak  (1990)  for  a  definition  and  analysis  in  the  context  of  general 
probability  distributions.] 
For  small  risks,  u  is much  larger  than  u’.  Thus  the  potential  usefulness  of 
first-order  risk  aversion  for  rationalizing  a sizeable  equity  premium  is evident. 
We  conjecture  that  any  theory  of  risk  preferences  which  implies  indifference 
curves  of  the  sort  in  fig.  1  would  produce  comparable  numerical  results 
regarding  the  equity  premium.  This  is  readily  verified  for  the  Chew  (1989) 
and  Gul  (1988)  risk  preferences,  which  are  axiomatically  distinct  from  the 
specifications  described  above  but  which  also  exhibit  first-order  risk  aversion. 
Of  course,  kinked  indifference  curves  can  appear  also  in  expected  utility 
theory.  Consider  the  general  (i.e.,  nonhomogeneous)  expected  utility  model: 
p(i)  =u+(Eu(.?)). 396  L.G.  Epstem  und  SE.  Zln,  ‘First-order‘  risk  ar’erston 
If  u  is  not  differentiable  at  a  point  2,  then  the  indifference  curve  through  z 
will  resemble  that  in  fig.  1  and  (20)  will  apply  for  gambles  having  expected 
value  X.  But  this  can  happen  only  rarely  since  any  increasing  and  concave 
function  u  can  fail  to  be  differentiable  at  most  at  a  countable  number  of 
points.  In  contrast,  for  ~~~ the  indifference  curve  in  fig.  1 is  representative  of 
all  indifference  curves  and  (20)  holds  for  all  binary  gambles. 
4.  Calibration  of  preferences 
Intertemporal  utility  of  the  representative  agent  has  the  recursive  structure 
(11,  where  the  aggregator  W  has  the  CES  form  (2)  and  the  risk  preference 
function  is  prd.  For  the  parameters  of  W,  p,  and  p,  we  consider  a  standard 
range  of  values. 
We  need  to  select  a functional  form  for  g  and  a parameter  (Y for  I’ defined 
in  (17).  For  g  we  adopt  the  functional  form 
g(P) =PYr  (21) 
where  0  <  y  i  1 is  a  parameter.  When  y  =  1 in  (21),  g(p)  =p  and  pLr,, is  the 
expected  utility  certainty  equivalent  defined  in  (3).  The  corresponding  in- 
tertemporal  utility  function  is  that  explored  by  EZ  (1989,  1990)  and  Weil 
(1989,  1990).  If  further  (Y  = p,  then  the  standard  intertemporal  expected 
utility  model  (e.g.,  Mehra  and  Prescott)  is  implied.  Weil  (1989)  has  shown 
that  allowing  CY  #p,  while  maintaining  y  =  1,  does  not  substantially  improve 
the  explanation  of  the  equity  premium.  We  attribute  this  finding  to  the  fact 
that  as  long  as  y  =  1 and  regardless  of  whether  or  not  cy = p,  risk  preferences 
exhibit  only  second-order  risk  aversion. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  y  <  1,  there  is  first-order  risk  aversion  with  the 
coefficient  li  in  (18)~(20)  given  by 
k =  (py  -p)/p’/‘(  1 -p)“‘. 
Since  k  is decreasing  in  y,  we  see  that  a smaller  y  implies  greater  aversion  to 
small  risks.  [In  fact,  it  implies  increased  aversion  to  all  risks;  see  Chew,  Karni, 
and  Safra  (1987I.l  The  numerical  value  of  y  is  obviously  of  critical  impor- 
tance. 
It  is natural  to  enquire  whether  there  exists  empirical  support  for  first-order 
risk  aversion  in  general,  or  for  y  <  1  in  our  particular  specification.  It  is 
shown  in  EZ  (1989)  that  the  agent’s  preference  functional  p  defines  attitudes 
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consumption  takes  place.  Since  the  bulk  of  the  behavioral/experimental 
evidence  regarding  individual  choice  under  uncertainty  is  based  on  choices 
amongst  timeless  gambles,  that  evidence  can  be  brought  to  bear  upon  the 
nature  of  CL. For  a  survey  of  the  evidence  we  have  in  mind  see  Machina 
(1982),  who  argues  that  widespread  and  systematic  violations  of  expected 
utility  are  indicated.  Segal  (1987a,  b)  has  shown  that  the  rank-dependent 
model  (16),  with  the  functional  form  (21)  for  g,  can  explain  the  Allais  and 
Ellsberg  paradoxes  if  (and  only  if>  y  <  1.  In  particular,  the  Mehra  and 
Prescott  specification  (y  =  1 and  LY  = p)  is  irzcompatible with  such  evidence. 
Segal  and  Spivak  (1990)  describe  some  behavioral  distinctions  between 
first-  and  second-order  risk  aversion.  Only  in  the  latter  case  is  it  true  that  any 
actuarially  favorable  bet  would  be  accepted  at  some  sufficiently  small  scale. 
Two  related  behavioral  observations  that  would  support  first-order  risk 
aversion  are:  (i)  specialization  in  the  safe  asset  in  a  two-asset  portfolio  choice 
in  spite  of  a positive  expected  excess  return  to  the  risky  asset  and  (ii> demand 
for  full  insurance  (zero  deductible)  given  positive  but  small  marginal  loading. 
Borch  (1974,  pp.  27-28)  claims  that  there  is  empirical  support  for  (ii).  It  is 
widely  thought  that  the  degree  of  portfolio  diversification  falls  short  of  that 
predicted  by  the  standard  expected  utility  portfolio  choice  model;  but  admit- 
tedly,  transactions  costs,  rather  than  misspecified  preferences,  could  be  the 
explanation. 
Even  if  it  is  admitted  that  y  <  1, a  magnitude  for  y  must  still  be  selected. 
Before  addressing  that  problem  we  consider  briefly  z’ and  its  parameter  cy 
[eq.  (1711. As  fig.  1 reveals,  regardless  of  the  choice  of  (Y, the  corresponding 
P,.~  agrees  with  py  (linear  z’, cy =  1) to  the  first-order  near-certainty,  i.e.,  the 
respective  indifference  curves  are  tangent  to  one  another  on  either  side  of 
the  certainty  line.  Consequently,  since  our  numerical  simulations  involve  only 
small  gambles  about  certainty,  the  choice  of  L’ is  of  little  consequence  for 
those  simulations  and  we  adopt  Yaari’s  specification  L’(X) =x. 
The  expected  utility  model  has  been  thoroughly  studied  and  applied  and 
there  exists  a  tradition  concerning  what  constitutes  a  plausible  value  for  the 
(constant)  degree  of  relative  risk  aversion,  namely  that  it  be  no  greater  than 
10.  In  contrast,  the  preference  specification  adopted  here  is  much  less 
familiar  and  it  is  not  immediately  clear  what  constitutes  a  plausible  magni- 
tude  for  y.  To  shed  some  light  on  the  magnitude  of  y  we  compare  F,,,  now 
denoted  PG.  and  the  expected  utility  function  (31,  denoted  kz,,  in  the 
following  way:  For  any  binary  gamble  with  m = Ei,  X,  <x,,  and  p,  =p, 
write 
x,=m- 
1  -p  ‘1’ 
i-1 




x,=mi-  - 
l-p  (73  (23) 
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normalize  by the  mean  and  thus  restrict  attention  to  gambles  with  unit  mean. 
For  fixed  p,  the  gamble  is completely  specified  by s = a/m,  the  coefficient  of 
variation,  which  we  use  as  a  measure  of  the  riskiness  of  i.  For  simplicity, 
therefore,  we may write  ~(~1 instead  of  ~(2).  where  2  is defined  in (33) with 
(m,a)  = (1, S)  and  where  the  dependence  upon  p  is  suppressed  in  the 
notation. 
By  the  nature  of  first-order  risk  aversion,  if  y  <  1,  then  ~Lyy  is  more 
risk-averse  than  p_t%,  for  gambles  concentrated  near  certainty,  for  any  cy, i.e., 
pLyy(  S)  <&Z”(s)  for  s near  0. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  inequality  is reversed  for  su~ciently  large  s.  More- 
over,  there  is  a  unique  critical  coefficient  of  variation  s*(y,  CX)  at  which 
comparative  degrees  of  risk  aversion  reverse,  where 
If  s*(y,  cr) = S, then  pu’y  and  ,LL”,,  exhibit  comparable  degrees  of  risk  aversion 
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Table  1 
Risk  averslon  comparison:  coefficient  of  variation.  s*(y.  (u).” 
a 
P  Y  0  -1  7  -3  -4  -9  -20 
0.50  0.50  0.71  0.41  0 29  0 21  0.18  0.09  0.04 
0.75  0.37  0.19  0  13  0.10  0.08  0.03  0.02 
0.90  0.14  0.07  0.05  0 04  0.03  0.01  0.01 
0.25  0.50  0.5 1  0.35  (1.X  0.20  0  17  0.09  0.04 
0.75  0.33  0.1’)  0.13  0. IO  0.08  0.04  0.0’ 
0.90  0.15  0.0X  0.05  0.04  0.03  0 01  0.01 
“s*(y,a)  is  the  coefficient  of  varratlon  that  equates  the  certainty  equivalent  associated  with 
Yaarl  preferences  with  risk  aversmn  parameter  y  and  expected  utility  preferences  with  risk 
aversion  parameter  (Y. The  probablhty  of  state  one  IS given  by  p. 
The  above  procedure  is illustrated  in  fig.  2.  Note  that  the  curve  for  kyU falls 
as  y  falls  toward  zero  and  similarly  for  pz,  as  (Y falls.  Also  included  in  this 
figure  is  the  curve  for  PL:;~ defined  by  (161  and  (171.  It  lies  everywhere  below 
the  curve  for  k;  and  is tangent  to  it  at  s =  0. which  has  the  implication  noted 
earlier  that  in  our  model  with  small  risks,  the  Yaari  certainty  equivalent  and 
the  rank-dependent  certainty  equivalent  yield  similar  numerical  results. 
Table  1 presents  values  of  s”  for  a number  of  (y,  (Y) pairs  and,  respectively, 
for  symmetric  bets  (p  =  +I  and  for  bets  having  p  =  f.  For  symmetric  gam- 
bles,  the  specification  of  pLy  corresponding  to  y  =  4  is  comparable  to  an 
expected  utility  ordering  with  relative  risk  aversion  coefficient  of  10  for 
gambles  having  a/m  near  0.09.  Thus  a  nontrivial  degree  of  aversion  towards 
a  small  amount  of  risk  near  certainty  is  compatible  with  a  degree  of  aversion 
to  moderate  risks  that  lies  within  the  range  considered  by  Mehra  and 
Prescott.  We  will  shortly  have  reason  to  consider  also  the  rank-dependent 
specification  having  y  =  i  and  CY  =  $  (rather  than  (Y  =  1 as  in  py).  Thus  for 
completeness  we  note  here  that  this  kcL,,,  function  produces  a  certainty-equiv- 
alent  value  equal  to  that  implied  by  the  above  borderline  specification  of 
Mehra  and  Prescott  for  symmetric  gambles  having  coefficient  of  variation 
equal  to  0.095. 
For  a concrete  example,  table  2 provides.  for  five  different  specifications  of 
risk  preferences  and  for  a  range  of  alternative  values  of  E, the  willingness  to 
pay  to  avoid  a  symmetric  gamble  with  outcomes  +E  given  wealth  equal  to 
75,000.  (Alternatively,  think  of  75,000  as  annual  income  and  and  fe  as 
perturbations  to  that  income.)  The  first  three  columns  extend  the  calculations 
reported  in  Kandel  and  Stambaugh  (1989)  and  substantiate  their  argument 
that  for  the  commonly  used  expected  utility  functional  form  it  seems  possible 
to  construct  a  gamble  that  makes  any  degree  of  relative  risk  aversion  appear 400  L. G.  Epsrev~ and  S. E.  ZWI, ‘Am-order’  risk aversion 
Table  2 
Some  ~wililngness-to-pay’  calculations.” 
~. 
Rusk  preferences 
- 
cL:u  FL%”  II:,,  Plc  IL?hU 
E  (LX=  -1)  (a=  -9)  tcu =  -29)  (y  =  i,  ty  =  ;,a  =  f) 
250  0.83  4.17  12.48  103.55  10364 
2.500  83.33  410.34  1.091.17  I,03553  1,044.19 
25.000  8.333.33  21.008.72  73,790.52  10.355.34  11.262.27 
40,000  21,333.33  37,198.OO  39.153.37  16.56854  19037.86 
50,000  33,333.33  47.998.5  1  49.39526  20,710.68  24,815.13 
60,000  48,000  00  58.799.10  59637.36  24.852.YI  31.323.84 
74.oM)  73.013.33  73.919‘94  73.97581  30,65  1.80  43,809.83 
“Entries  give  the  wilhngness  to  pay  to  avoid  a  gamble  with  equally  likely  outcomes  -tt,  given 
initral  wealth  equal  to  75,000.  Thus,  for  each  p  and  F,  the  appropriate  entry  is  75,000  -p(X), 
where  .C equals  75,000  t  P  wtth  probabtlity  i. 
unreasonable  on  introspective  grounds.  For  example,  if relative  risk  aversion 
is 2,  the  individual  would  pay  ‘only’  0.83  to  avoid  the  smallest  gamble  and 
‘only’  83.33  to  avoid  the  gamble  with  F = 2,500.  Note  that  the  latter  gamble 
has  a  coefficient  of  variation  roughly  equal  to  that  of  the  U.S.  per  capita 
consumption  growth  rate  series  used  by  Mehra  and  Prescott  (1985)  and  in 
section  5 below.  If relative  risk aversion  equals  30, the  willingness  to pay  rises 
to  12.48 for  the  small  gamble.  But  then  the  individual  would  pay  23,790.52  to 
avoid  the  gamble  having  E = 25,000. 
The  functional  form  p;Ly implies  reasonable  risk  attitudes  for  a  broader 
range  of  gamble  sizes,  though  the  willingness  to  pay  seems  too  large  for  the 
smallest  gamble  and  too  small  for  the  largest  gamble.  The  former  problem 
can  be  ameliorated  by  taking  y  close  to  1. The  latter  problem  is due  to  the 
piecewise  linearity  of  the  indifference  curves  of  the  Yaari  functional  and  is 
ameliorated  by considering  the  rank-dependent  form  with  CY  #  1 in (17).  For 
example,  if  cx  = 0.75  (and  y = OS),  then  ~~~ implies  much  more  reasonable 
levels  for  willingness  to  pay  to  avoid  large  gambles.  Moreover,  the  change 
from  LU  =  1 to  cz = 0.75  is  of  little  consequence  for  the  evaluation  of  the 
gamble  having  E = 2,500 which,  as noted,  is the  gamble  size that  corresponds 
most  closely  to  the  equity  premium  puzzle.  This  supports  our  contention, 
which  we noted  earlier  but  which  bears  repetition,  that  virtually  the  identical 
numerical  results  for  the  model  economy  of  section  5 would  be  obtained  if 
*cL’y  were  replaced  by  I_LL:~~  and  a! = 0.75. The  significance  of  this  observation 
is that  the  levels  of  the  risk-free  rate  and  the  equity  premium  obtained  below 
are  compatible  with  plausible  risk  attitudes  over  a  very  broad  range  of 
gamble  sizes  as demonstrated  in the  final  column  of  table  2.’ 
4We  chose  to  formulate  the  analysts  of  section  5  m  terms  of  ,u~  rather  than  pLrd because  the 
former  delivers  some  elegant  and  intuitive  closed-form  expressrons.  See  particularly  (26)  below. L.C.  Epsrern  and  S. E  Zin.  ‘First-order’  risk  at>erslon  401 
5.  The  equity  premium 
5.1.  I.i.d.  consumption  growth” 
Consider  first  the  following  simple  endowment  process:  growth  rates  ,i! are 
i.i.d.  and  can  assume  the  symmetric  values  Ei  -  8  and  E.?  +  E.  Typically, 
these  states  occur  with  equal  probability,  although  we  will  consider  some 
asymmetric  distributions.  As  in  Mehra  and  Prescott,  we  choose  these  states 
to  approximately  match  the  first  two  sample  moments  of  aggregate  U.S.  data, 
i.e..  E,i? =  1.018  and  F =  (varn’)“’  =  u  =  0.036.  We  also  consider  experiments 
with  roughly  double  the  variance.  i.e.,  u  =  0.051. 
Adopt  the  Yaari  risk  preference  function  p*u  in  which  case  (9)  simplifies  to 
the  linear  problem 
max  ap(ti)  +  (1  -a)~~. 
OSUSl 
(9’) 
We  conclude  that 
rf=p(ii). 
Since  k  =  ZG,  where  K  is  given  by  (1 l),  it  follows  that 
(25) 
(26) 
Relation  (26)  is  very  intuitive  and  provides  considerable  insight  into  the 
workings  of  our  model  economy.  For  example,  it  resolves  the  ‘risk-free  rate 
puzzle’  emphasized  by  Weil(1989).  If  consumption  grows  on  average,  say,  2% 
per  year  and  consumption  is  not  very  substitutable  over  time  (as  much  of  the 
‘Kocherlakota  (1990)  has  observed  that  in  an  1.i.d  world  It  is  imposstble  to  distmguish 
empirically  between  the  standard  expected  intertemporal  utility  model  and  recurstve  intertempo- 
ral  utihty.  Stmilarly,  risk  preferences  are  not  recoverable  from  observations  of  equihbrium  prtces 
in  an  1.t.d.  economy.  On  first  reflection,  therefore,  one  might  question  how  we  can  hope  to 
improve  upon  the  Mehra  and  Prescott  analysts,  at  least  in  the  context  of  an  i.i.d.  economy 
However,  as  was  discussed  in  the  introduction,  the  reasonableness  of  the  utility  specification  IS 
an  integral  part  of  the  puzzle  posed  by  Mehra  and  Prescott.  While  an  expected  uttlity 
specification  with  negative  time  preference  and/or  very  large  degree  of  relattve  risk  aversion 
may  be  able  to  match  the  data  as  well  as  or  even  more  closely  than  our  model.  such  a 
specification  1s widely  perceived  with  misgivings  for  reasons  that  were  m  part  descrtbed  above. 
The  plausibility  of  our  utihty  spectfication  was  argued  in  section  4. 
Of  course.  the  question  of  whether  or  not  alternative  utility  functions  are  empirically 
distingutshable,  given  observations  from  a  single  dynamic  equilibrtum.  is  important  m  deciding 
on  the  broader  usefulness  of  new  models  of  preference.  Lest  the  reader  be  mtsled  by  this 
reference  to  Kocherlakota’s  observatton.  we  refer  the  reader  to  EZ  (1990)  where  the  expected 
utility  and  recurstve  intertemporal  utility  models  are  distingmshed  econometrically,  and  to  Wang 
(1990)  who  shows  that  genertcally  in  the  space  of  economies  the  Kocherlakota  observation  fads: 
that  is,  the  i.i.d.  case  is very  special  rather  than  representative  These  issues  are  dtscussed  more 
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empirical  literature  suggests),  then  how can  the  equilibrium  real  interest  rate 
be  small?  Short  of  assuming  negative  time  preference,  expected  utility 
models  have  a great  deal  of difficulty  dealing  with  this  question.  On  the  other 
hand,  (26)  shows  that  since,  in  our  model,  it  is the  certainty  equivalent  of 
consumption  growth  that  determines  the  equilibrium  level  of  the  risk-free 
rate,  use  of  simple  averages  for  gaining  intuition  about  the  relationship 
between  consumption,  the  real  interest  rate,  and  the  elasticity  of  intertempo- 
ral  substitution,  may  be  misleading.  However,  the  basic  intuition  about 
consumption  and  interest  rates  that  is  derived  from  deterministic  models 
holds  in our  model,  provided  appropriate  certainty  equivalents  are  computed. 
Preferences  that  exhibit  first-order  risk  aversion  yield  a certainty  equivalent 
of  consumption  growth  that  is  significantly  smaller  than  its  mean.  If  this 
certainty-equivalent  growth  rate  is  near  one,  then  a  moderate  level  of  the 
risk-free  rate  is implied  for  a range  of values  for  p. This  consequence  of  (26) 
is central  to the  ability  of this model  to generate  both  a low risk-free  rate  and 
a nontrivial  equity  premium  without  resorting  to  negative  time  preference. 
The  equity  premium  Ehj  -  T, can  be  computed  from  (26)  and  (10)  once 
parameter  values  are  selected.  For  example,  if  -y =  ‘5. then  p(X)  =  1.003 for 
the  symmetric  case  with  CT  = 0.036.  If  further.  p =  -  1.0 and  p  = (1.02)-‘, 
then  ff =  1.026 and  E$  -  rf = 0.016.  Note  that,  as anticipated,  the  certainty 
equivalent  of  consumption  growth  is substantially  smaller  than  the  mean  in 
this  case.  Table  3 summarizes  the  results  for  a number  of  i.i.d.  experiments. 
The  preference  parameters,  y  and  p,  vary  across  experiments  as  do  the 
parameters  of  the  consumption  growth  process.  It  is  interesting  to  note 
the  effect  increasing  the  negative  skewness  (lowering  the  probability  of  the 
unfavorable  state,  p =  f),  while  holding  the  standard  deviation  fixed  at 0.036, 
has  on  the  certainty  equivalent  associated  with  y =  4:  it  falls  below  one. 
Therefore,  by (26), for  this  certainty  equivalent,  the  level  of the  risk-free  rate 
is increasing  in the  elasticity  of  intertemporal  substitution.  In  contrast  to  the 
results  in  Weil  (19891,  a  smaller  elasticity,  in  this  case,  generates  a  smaller 
risk-free  rate.  This  reduction  in the  level  of  the  risk-free  rate,  however,  does 
not  imply  a reduction  in the  equity  premium.  For  example,  when  y =  + and 
p =  -  1, the  risk-free  rate  is 1.4%  and  the  equity  premium  is 2.1%.  Lowering 
p to  -4  results  in a risk-free  rate  of 0.6%  with  an equity  premium  that  is still 
2.1%. 
In  the  sense  of  the  last  section,  our  risk  preference  specification  with 
y = 0.5  is comparable  to  a  degree  of  relative  risk  aversion  equal  to  10 given 
the  usual  expected  utility  specification  for  risk  preferences.  Thus  compare 
our  results  with  for  y = 0.5 with  those  implied  by  the  Kreps-Porteus  model 
used  in Weil  (19891, fixing the  coefficient  of  relative  risk aversion  at  10. If the 
elasticity  of  intertemporal  substitution  is  equal  to  0.5  (p  =  -  l),  then  the 
risk-free  rate  equals  3.8%  and  the  equity  premium  is 1.3% (in  the  symmetric 
case  with  /3 = (1.02)-r  and  u = 0.036).  Lowering  the  substitution  elasticity  to L. G.  Epstein  and  S. E.  Zm,  ‘First-order  ’ nsk  ar’erston 
Table  3 
Equilibrium  returns  and  equity  premia  (1.i.d.  consumption  growth).” 
P  P 
-1  0.50 
0.25 
-4  0.50 
0 25 
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1.006  0.021 
1 069  0.009 
1 098  0.004 
_h  _h 
1.050  0.013 
1.091  0.005 
1.052  0.016 
1.140  0.006 
1 189  0.003 
_h  _h 
1.109  0.010 
1.176  0.004 
_h  _h 
1 1’0  0.009 
1.183  0.003 
_h  _h 
1.081  0.013 
1.168  0.005 
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“The  random  endowment  growth  follows  a  two-state  Markov  process  with  states  m  -  (p/Cl  - 
P)) ‘J”(r  and  m  +  ((1  -p)/p)“‘o,  where  p  is  the  unconditional  probabihty  of  state  1,  m  is  the 
uncondmonal  mean.  and  (T  IS the  unconditional  standard  deviatton.  The  discount  factor  for 
preferences,  p.  is  set  to  (1.02)-’  and  the  autocorrelatton  coeffictent  coefficient,  0,  IS set  equal  to 
zero,  i.e.,  these  are  all  i.i.d.  expertments. 
hNo  equihbrium  extsts  for  these  parameter  values. 404  L.G.  Epstein  and  S.E.  Zwt,  ‘First-order’  risk  ac,ersion 
0.2  (p  =  -  4)  results  in  a risk-free  rate  of  7.5%  and  an  equity  premium  that  is 
still  approximately  1.3%.  Finally,  lowering  the  substitution  elasticity  to  0.1 
(p  =  -9)  reduces  this  model  to  the  Mehra-Prescott  expected  utility  model 
and  results  in  a  risk-free  rate  of  14.0%  and  an  unchanged  equity  premium  of 
approximately  1.3%.6  For  the  asymetric  distribution,  the  level  of  the  risk-free 
rate  is  slightly  smaller  and  the  equity  premium  is  slightly  larger.  Therefore, 
comparable  models  with  only  second-order  risk  aversion  consistently  gener- 
ate  high  levels  of  returns  and  do  not  typically  predict  a  large  equity  premium 
for  these  experiments. 
5.2.  Autocorrelated  consumption  growth 
More  generally,  we  consider  serially  dependent,  two-state  Markov  pro- 
cesses  for  endowment  growth  with  transition  probabilities  given  by 
p,,=Prob[x,=x,  lx,_,  =x,1. 
Further,  without  loss  of  generality  in  the  two-state  economy,  we  parameterize 
the  serial  dependence  with  the  autocorrelation  parameter  6’ such  that 
PL,  =p,(l  -  0)  +6,,0,  -1<e<1, 
where  p,  is  the  unconditional  (or  equilibrium)  probability  of  being  in  state  j 
and  6,,  =  1 for  i = j  and  is  zero  otherwise.  The  two  states  are  determined  as 
in  eq.  (23)  for  given  values  for  the  mean,  m,  the  standard  deviation,  u,  and 
the  probability  of  the  first  state,  p,  for  the  unconditional  distribution  of  the 
endowment  growth  process. 
Table  4 presents  means  and  standard  deviations  for  equilibrium  equity  and 
bond  returns  computed  for  a  variety  of  endowment  processes  and  values  of 
the  preference  parameters.  The  persistence  parameter  is varied  across  simu- 
lations  to  allow  for  both  negative  (0  =  -0.2)  and  positive  (0  =  0.2)  serial 
dependence.  The  risk-preference  parameter,  y,  is  chosen  to  be  0.5,  0.75,  or 
0.9  with  0.5  being  the  most  risk-averse  and  0.9  the  least  risk-averse.  The 
simulation  results  in  table  4  relate  to  a  symmetric  unconditional  distribution 
( p,  =p2  = p  =  +)  with  unconditional  mean  and  variance  of  1.018  and  0.036, 
respectively.  The  substitution  parameter,  p,  is  chosen  to  be  -  1,  -  4,  or  -  9 
corresponding  to  intertemporal  substitution  elasticities  in  consumption  of  0.5, 
0.2,  and  0.1,  respectively.  The  rate  of  time  preference  is  fixed  at  0.02  so  that 
‘Weil  (1988)  shows  that  if  (one  plus)  the  equity  premmm  is  defined  as  the  ratio  of  the  gross 
equity  return  to  the  gross  bond  return.  the  elastictty  of  intertemporal  substitution  has  no  effect 
on  the  premtum  m  the  1.t.d.  economy.  Since  we  have  defined  the  premium  as  the  dtfference  in 
the  returns.  thts  elastictty  can  have  an  effect  on  the  premmm,  though  this  effect  is  negligible  for 
the  typtcal  1.t.d.  experiment. L.G.  Epstein  and  S.E.  Zln.  ‘First-order’  nsk  aL,ersion 
Table  4 
Equilibrium  returns  and  equity  premia  (autocorrelated  consumption  growth).d 
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P  Y  0  E(M)  Sd(M)  Etr,)  Sd( rf )  ECM-r,)  Sd(M  -  rr) 
-1  0.50  -  0.2  1.044  0.043  1.027  0.010  0.017  0.041 
0.2  1.039  0.033  1.027  0.011  0 012  0.030 
0.75  -  0.2  1.051  0.044  1.043  0.013  0.008  0.042 
0.2  1.039  0.032  1.044  0 013  0.005  0.029 
0 90  -02  1.055  0.045  1.051  0.014  0.004  0.042 
02  1.054  0 032  1.052  0.014  0.002  0.028 
-4  0.50  -  0.2  1.060  0.062  1.037  0.026  0.023  0.055 
0.2  1.043  0.030  1.038  0.027  0.005  0.012 
0.75  -0.2  1.091  0.070  1.078  0.034  0.013  0.060 
0.2  1.082  0.035  1.080  0.034  0.002  0.007 
0.90  -  0.2  1.107  0.072  1.101  0.038  0.006  0.062 
0.2  1.103  0.038  1.103  0.038  0.000  0.005 
-9  0.50  -  0.2  1.089  0.09x  1.054  0.053  0.036  0.078 
0 2  1 050  0.055  1.050  0.054  0.000  0.017 
0.75  -  0.7  1.162  0.117  1.131  0.072  0.021  0.090 
0.3  1 141  0.078  1 141  0.074  0.000  0.0’9 
0.90  -  0.2  I.200  0.125  1.189  0.08  1  0011  0.094 
0.2  1 192  0 088  1.192  0.081  0 000  0.033 
“Random  consumptton  growth  follows  a  two-state  Markov  process  wtth  states  WI  -  (p/Cl  - 
p))’  ‘V  and  m  +((l  -p)/p)“‘rr.  where  p  IS the  unconditional  probabdity  of  state  1.  m  IS the 
uncondittonal  mean,  c  is  the  unconditronal  standard  deviatton,  and  0  IS the  autocorrelation 
coefficient.  The  parameters  p.  m.  and  rr  are  set  at  0.5.  1.01X,  and  0.036,  respecttvely.  and  the 
discount  factor  for  preferences.  p.  is  set  at  (1.07)-  ‘. 
the  discount  factor,  /3,  is  approximately  equal  to  0.98.  The  largest  average 
equity  premium  generated  by  the  simulations  in  table  4  is  3.5%  (when 
y  =  0.5,  p  =  -9,  8 =  -0.2)  and  the  smallest  is  0.0%  (when  p =  -9, 0  = 0.2). 
The  typical  premium,  however,  is  between  1%  and  2%  so  that  the  i.i.d. 
examples  above  are  fairly  representative. 
The  following  patterns  emerge  upon  examination  of  these  tables:  The 
average  premium  on  equity  gets  larger  (i)  as  the  agent  becomes  more 
risk-averse,  (ii)  as  the  endowment  growth  process  gets  more  negatively 
autocorrelated,  (iii)  as  the  distribution  for  endowment  growth  becomes  more 
skewed,  (iv)  as  the  variance  of  the  endowment  growth  becomes  larger,  (v)  as 
substitutability  decreases  when  endowment  growth  is  negatively  autocorre- 
lated,  and  (vi)  as  substitutability  increases  when  the  endowment  growth  is 
positively  autocorrelated. 
The  model  also  tends  to  underpredict  the  second  moments  of  equity  return 
data.  The  largest  standard  deviation  for  the  equity  return  in  table  4  is  12.5%, 
which  is smaller  than  the  16.5%  reported  in  Mehra  and  Prescott  for  historical 406  L.G  Epteirz  and  SE.  Zm  ‘First-order’  risk awnon 
data.  The  largest  standard  error  for  the  risk-free  bond  is  8.1%,  which  is 
larger  than  the  historical  estimate  of 5.7%.  The  largest  equity  premium  is not 
necessarily  associated  with  the  largest  standard  deviations  for  returns.  The 
experiment  that  generates  the  largest  premium  generates  a  standard  devia- 
tion  for  equity  returns  of  9.8%  and  a standard  deviation  for  bond  returns  of 
5.3%.  The  model,  therefore,  is unable  to  account  for  all  of  the  variance  in 
stock  returns  but  does  account  for  most  of  the  variance  in bond  returns. 
6.  Conclusion 
We  have  explored  whether  the  specification  of  first-order  risk  aversion  for 
risk  preferences  can  help  to  resolve  the  equity  premium  puzzle  posed  by 
Mehra  and  Prescott  (1985).  Our  findings  indicate  that  we  can  account  for  a 
low  risk-free  rate  and  an  average  equity  premium  of  roughly  2%.  This  is in 
contrast  to  the  historical  average  risk  premium  of  6.2%  and  the  largest 
premium  obtainable  by  Mehra  and  Prescott  of  0.35%.  Thus  our  utility 
specification  can  only  partially  resolve  the  puzzle.  That  it cannot  resolve  the 
puzzle  completely,  we  find  neither  surprising  nor  discouraging.  We  expect 
that  features  of real  economies  that  have  frequently  been  mentioned,  such  as 
money  and  incomplete  markets,  will  be  required  for  a  complete  resolution. 
But  this  paper  does  provide  some  reason  to  believe  that  first-order  risk 
aversion  may  be  part  of  such  a complete  explanation. 
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